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Mean and volatility spillovers
Contagiona b s t r a c t
This paper examines mean and volatility spillovers between three major cryptocurrencies
(Bitcoin, Litecoin and Ethereum) and the role played by cyber-attacks. Specifically, trivari-
ate GARCH-BEKK models are estimated which include suitably defined dummies corre-
sponding to different types, targets and number per day of cyber-attacks. Significant
dynamic linkages (interdependence) between the three cryptocurrencies under investiga-
tion are found in most cases when cyber-attacks are taken into account, Bitcoin appearing
to be the dominant cryptocurrency. Further, Wald tests for parameter shifts during epi-
sodes of turbulence resulting from cyber-attacks provide evidence that the latter affect
the transmission mechanism between cryptocurrency returns and volatilities (contagion).
More precisely, cyber-attacks appear to strengthen cross-market linkages, thereby reduc-
ing portfolio diversification opportunities for cryptocurrency investors. Finally, the condi-
tional correlation analysis confirms the previous findings.
 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Digital currencies, commonly known as cryptocurrencies, have established themselves in recent years both as an alter-
native to fiat money (see Yermack, 2018) and as a tradable asset used for risk-hedging purposes (see Bouri et al., 2017a,
2017c). Given their increasing importance, a number of studies have been carried out to analyse the main features of these
newly created markets, including returns and risk (e.g., Balciar et al., 2017; Liu and Tsyvinski, 2018; Caporale and Zekokh,
2019), market efficiency (e.g., Urquhart, 2016; Bariviera, 2017; Nadarajah and Chu, 2017) and anomalies (Caporale et al.,
2018; Caporale and Plastun, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c), illegal activities (Foley et al., 2018, Li et al., 2018; Gandal et al., 2018;
Griffin and Shams, 2018), hedging properties (e.g., Dyhrberg 2016a, 2016b; Baur et al., 2018; Bouri et al., 2017a, 2017b,
2017c), initial coin offerings (ICO) (Kostovetsky and Benedetti. 2018; Howell et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018; Li and Mann,
2018; Malinova and Park, 2017; An et al., 2020), the effects of cyber-attacks (Caporale et al., 2019; An et al., 2020;
Shanaev et al., 2019), and the economic implications of the emergence of this new type of asset (e.g., Böhme et al., 2015;
Dwyer, 2015; Harvey, 2016; Raskin and Yermack 2016; Bariviera et al., 2017; Biais et al., 2018; Schilling and Uhlig 2018).
Understanding the linkages between cryptocurrencies is crucial for risk management, portfolio diversification, hedging
and arbitrage purposes. In particular, investors need to understand the degree of contagion risk they are exposed to when
trading cryptocurrencies (Koutmos, 2018) and to choose suitable ones to diversify their portfolios according to their riskin the
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markets on the basis of short-run linkages and hedgers seek markets with the highest degree of correlation in the medium-
to long-term. Some recent studies have investigated these issues. For instance, Fry and Cheah (2016) detect spillovers from
Ripple to Bitcoin using an econophysics approach. Ciaian et al. (2018) estimate an ARDL model to examine the relationship
between 17 virtual currencies and Altcoin and find stronger linkages between Bitcoin and Altcoin in the short as opposed to
the long run. Bacao et al. (2018) find strong contemporaneous correlations between five major cryptocurrencies using
unconditional returns; further, their results suggest that Bitcoin is the dominant currency in terms of informational flows.
More recently, Borri (2019) analyses co-movement between returns on four cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ether, Ripple and Lite-
coin) and other global assets such as US equities or gold, both unconditionally and conditionally. Specifically, he measures
the conditional tail-risk using the CoVaR (conditional value-at-risk) method introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).
His results indicate that cryptocurrency returns are highly correlated among themselves but not with other assets, and that
portfolios of cryptocurrencies are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk and can be useful for hedging purposes (though only to a
limited extent once their degree of liquidity has been taken into account).
Another important issue is whether or not spillovers change over time. For instance, Boako et al. (2019) apply vine copula
methods to analyse both the co-dependence and portfolio value-at-risk (VaR) of six cryptocurrencies and find evidence of
strong dependencies and a changing dependency structure. By contrast, the findings in Borro (2019) concerning the condi-
tional correlation between cryptocurrencies and other assets appear to be robust to the introduction of time variation into
the empirical model. Ji et al. (2019) examine network connectedness in both the returns and volatility of six major cryptocur-
rencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Litecoin, Stellar and Dash) using daily data over the period 7 August 2015 – 22 February
2018 and computing a set of measures developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2016). They distinguish between positive-
and negative-return spillovers and consider various market characteristics as possible determinants of spillovers. They also
test the robustness of their full-sample results by redoing the analysis for two sub-samples, the first being more stable, the
second starting at the beginning of 2017 and including the 2017 bull market. Their findings indicate that Bitcoin and Litecoin
have the dominant transmitting role; the sub-sample results have both similarities and differences compared to the full-
sample ones.
Other studies examine volatility linkages and their changes over time. In particular, Yi et al. (2018) construct a spillover
index with some variants for eight cryptocurrencies (i.e., Bitcoin, Ripple, Litecoin, Peercoin, Namecoin, Feathercoin, Novacoin
and Terracoin) and conclude that volatility connectedness fluctuates cyclically, and increases when economic conditions are less
stable; because this measure does not depend on the market share even cryptocurrencies with smaller trading volumes are
found to contribute to the propagation of shocks. By contrast, Koutmos (2018) detects a dominant role for Bitcoin in terms
of return and volatility spillovers among the 18 largest cryptocurrencies by market capitalization; he also finds that spillovers
have been increasing over time and exhibit spikes corresponding to major news events concerning cryptocurrencies. Katsiampa
(2019) estimates a GARCH-BEKK model and finds volatility co-movements between five cryptocurrencies; further, Litecoin and
Bitcoin both exhibit a structural break in their conditional variance. Antonakakis et al. (2019) investigate network connected-
ness between nine cryptocurrencies using an approach which extends the framework of Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), specifically
time-varying parameters principal component analysis (TVP-PCA); since connectedness appears to follow a decreasing trend,
they then split the sample into pre- and post-August 2017 sub-samples on the basis of an increase in market capitalization
at that time, and show that lower volatility is associated with weaker connectedness. Omane-Adjepong and Alagidede
(2019) examine market connectedness between seven cryptocurrencies using wavelet methods and also investigate volatility
linkages by estimating GARCH specifications; they find various non-homogenous spillovers and possible diversification benefits
within intra-week to intra- monthly time horizons for specific pairs.
Most recently, Corbet et al. (2020) analyse the contagion effects between Chinese stock markets resulting from the
COVID-2019 pandemic; the evidence based on high-frequency data suggests an increase in the dynamic correlations
between Chinese stock indices, gold and Bitcoin, i.e. the latter do not act as hedges, or safe havens, but instead amplify con-
tagion. Similar conclusions are reached by Conlon and McGee (2020) vis-à-vis the S&P500. In general, cryptocurrencies seem
to be suitable for diversification purposes but not as a hedge (see Gil-Alana et al., 2020; Liu, 2019; Tiwari et al., 2019, Feng
et al., 2018).
The present study investigates both ‘‘interdependence”, namely the existence of dynamic linkages, and ‘‘contagion”,
defined as a shift in the return and volatility spillover parameters (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, and Caporale et al.,
2005, 2006), among three major cryptocurrencies, namely Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin, where the dates for the shifts
are identified using cyber-attack data. The framework employed for the empirical analysis is a trivariate GARCH-BEKK model
which includes suitably defined dummies associated with different types, targets and number per day of cyber-attacks col-
lected from Hackmageddon (http://www.hackmageddon.com). These are classified by target sectors (government, industry,
financial institution and cryptocurrency), attack nature (cyber-crime, cyber espionage, cyber warfare and hacktivism) and
target country (US versus non-US).
We find that cyber-attacks targeting cryptocurrencies have a major impact on the dynamic linkages between the three
cryptocurrencies under examination, especially in the case of their second moments, and that Bitcoin plays a dominant role1 Using a similar approach, Corbet et al. (2018) find that Bitcoin, Ripple and Litecoin are highly correlated with each other but not with other types of assets,
which implies that the former can be used for portfolio diversification purposes.
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ally positive, and they are higher in the subsample including only days with cyber-attacks, the largest shifts in the correlation
parameters occurring when cyber-attacks target cryptocurrencies. Therefore, cyber-attacks strengthen cross-market link-
ages and consequently reduce portfolio diversification opportunities for cryptocurrency investors.
It is noteworthy that the capital raised for FinTech development has been rising exponentially. Global investment in Fin-
tech companies reached $57 billion in the first half of 2018, up from $38.1 billion over the whole of 2017 (KPMG, 2018), and
major financial institutions and technology firms have been increasing their investment in Fintech innovation (Nash, 2016;
Russo, 2017; Chen et al., 2019). However, despite widespread interest across the globe the finance literature focusing on Fin-
tech is still very limited (Chen et al., 2019; Goldstein et al., 2019). Fintech can be classified in seven categories (Chen et al.,
2019): cybersecurity, mobile transactions, data analytics, blockchain, peer-to-peer (P2P), robo-advising and internet of
things (IoT).2 Our paper adds to the understanding of Fintech in its blockchain and cybersecurity aspects and contributes to
the literature on asset diversification.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodology. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 dis-
cusses the empirical results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2. Methodology
2.1. Basic model
We represent the first and second moments of cryptocurrency returns using a trivariate VAR-GARCH(1,1) process. In its





are notxt ¼ aþ bxt1 þ fzt1 þ et ð1Þ
where xt = (Bitcoint, Ethereumt, Litecoint), xt-1 is a corresponding vector of lagged returns, and et = (e1,t, e2,t, e3,t) is a residual
vector. Furthermore, zt-1 is the Chicago Board Options Exchange index of implied volatility from options on the US S&P 500
(VIX). This is a widely quoted indicator of market sentiment, and is used as a control variable to identify episodes of turbu-
lence in conventional stock markets. The parameters of the mean return Eq. (1) comprise the constant terms a = (a1, a2, a3)
and the parameters of the autoregressive terms b = (b11, b12, b13 | b21, b22, b23 | b31, b32, b33), which allow for cross-currency
mean return spillovers. The residual vector et is trivariate and normally distributed et | It-1 ~ (0, Ht) with its conditional vari-












75 ð2ÞIn the multivariate GARCH(1,1)-BEKK representation proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995), which guarantees by con-

































































ð3ÞEq. (3) models the dynamic process of Ht as a linear function of its own past values Ht-1 and past values of the innovations
(e1,t-1, e2,t-1, e3,t-1), allowing for own-market and cross-market influences in the conditional variances. The parameters of (3)
are given by C0, which is restricted to be upper triangular, and two matrices A and G whose elements are the a and g coef-
ficients respectively. The off-diagonal parameters in the latter two matrices capture the volatility spillovers (causality-in-
variance) among the three cryptocurrencies under investigation.
Given a sample of T observations, a vector of unknown parameters3 h, and a 3  1 vector of variables xt, the conditional






ð4Þn et al. (2019) define the peer-to-peer (P2P), robo-advising and Internet of things (IoT) as follows. Peer-to-peer (P2P): Software, systems, or platforms
ilitate consumer-to-consumer financial transactions. Robo-advising: Computer systems or programs that provide automated investment advice to
ers or portfolio managers. Internet of things (IoT): Technologies relating to smart devices that gather data in real time and communicate via the internet.
dard errors (SE) are calculated using the quasi-maximum likelihood method of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992), which is robust to the distribution of
erlying residuals. A residual vector et following the t-student distribution has also been considered. These results are qualitatively similar and therefore
reported. The complete set of results is available from the authors upon request.
3
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5 The
five ma
(BitcoinLog  Lik ¼
Xt¼1
T
logf xtjIt1; hð Þ ð5ÞIn recent years, sever types of models have been used to investigate cross-country co-movements. Among those, copula
models have become increasingly popular. A comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of using them rather than DCC
and GARCH models can be found in Al Rahahleh and Bhatti (2017), Nguyen et al. (2017) and Bhatti and Do (2019). Given the
nature of our research question, we have chosen to estimate reduced-form VAR models including a GARCH component
because of their suitability to analyse both co-movement and spillover effects within the same econometric framework. Fur-
thermore, the adopted BEKK representation guarantees by construction the positive-definiteness of the variance–covariance
matrix.
2.2. Mean and volatility contagion
Applying the concept of shift contagion (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) to the analysis of interdependencies in the first and
second moments, we define mean and volatility contagion, respectively, as a shift in the transmission of returns and volatil-
ity among crypto currencies during episodes of cyber-attacks. In order to test for such shifts, we include in equations (1) and
(3) a dummy D that allows the parameters governing mean and volatility spillovers to change in days associated with these
episodes.4 For instance, the equations for the conditional mean and variance of Bitcoin returns become respectively:Bitcoint ¼ a1 þ b11Bitcoint1 þ b12 þ b12
 
Ethereumt1 þ b13 þ b13
 
Litecoint1 þ fzt1 þ e2;t
andh11;t ¼ c211 þ a211e21;t1 þ a212e22;t1 þ a13 þ a13Â  D
 2
e23;t1
þ2a11a12e1;t1e2;t1 þ 2a11 a13 þ a13Â  D
 
e1;t1e3;t1 þ 2a12 a13 þ a13Â  D
 
e2;t1e3;t1
þg11 2h11;t1 þ g12 2h22;t1 þ g13 þ g13 Â  D
 2
h33;t1
þ2g11g12h12;t1 þ 2g11 g13 þ g13 Â  D
 
h13;t1 þ 2g12 g13þg13 ÂDð Þh23;t1 ð6ÞMean spillovers from Ethereum and Litcoin to Bitcoin are measured by the parameters b12 and b13, whereas b12* and b13*
capture shifts in these parameters during episodes of cyber-attacks. Similarly, volatility spillovers from Ethereum and Litcoin
to Bitcoin are measured by the parameters a12 and g12, and a13 and g13 respectively; a12* and g12*, and a13* and g13* instead
capture shifts in these parameters during episodes of cyber-attacks.3. Data set and identification of cyber-attacks
3.1. Crypto currencies
The trivariate GARCH model outlined in the preceding section was estimated for three crypto currencies (Bitcoin, Ether-
eum and Litecoin). The series are daily and have been collected from the website www.CryptoDataDownload.com; this pro-
vides historical time series data for traded prices using the Application Programming Interface (API) service and is a reliable
cryptocurrency data source as pointed out by Alexander and Dakos (2020). We choose five main exchanges (Bitfinex, Coin-
base, Gemini, Kraken and Poloniex) that are common to the three cryptocurrencies under examination; the sample period
goes from 12 August 2015 to 15 January 2020.5 We then compute market capital-weighted indices which are based on the
five exchanges. Natural log returns are used for the estimation of the models; these series are displayed in Fig. 1.
3.2. Cyber-attacks
The recent developments in networking and cyberspace technology, including cryptocurrencies and blockchain technol-
ogy, have yielded significant benefits. However, the rapid growth in these fields has also been associated with the rise ofsection 3.3 for details on the construction of the dummies.
www.CryptoDataDownload.com website does not provide all the cryptocurrency exchanges for each country. Thus, we select from this source data for
jor exchanges (the same as in Alexander and Dakos (2020)) in the US and the UK that are common to the three cryptocurrencies being examined
, Ethereum and Litecoin) and were available at the time when they were collected.
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being an attempt to damage, destroy or gain illegal access to a computer network or system (Bodford and Kwan, 2018).
The most common type of cyber-attack is ‘‘double-spending”, when the attacker manipulates the blockchain consensus to
secure a financial gain (Shanaev et al., 2019). This could be quite limited as the miner needs a substantial initial investment
to purchase specialised hardware and the cryptocurrency price may drop significantly as a result of investors losing confi-
dence in the market, especially if the attacker controls over 50% of the mining capacity in the blockchain (Kroll et al., 2013;
Shanaev et al., 2019). However, the number of attempted and successful cyber-attacks on blockchains and cryptocurrencies
has significantly increased over time for the following reasons. Firstly, cryptocurrency prices have risen sharply, which has
made double-spending more attractive and profitable. Secondly, many altcoins (i.e., cryptocurrency coins other than Bitcoin)5
Fig. 2. Cyber-Attacks by Target.
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very small involvement of communities. Thirdly, the mining industry has started to offer computational power for rent,
which significantly lowers the initial investment required (Shanaev et al., 2019). An et al. (2020) argue that the negative
impacts of cyber-attacks can be mitigated if the institutions protect investor better in anti-director rights (La Porta et al
2002), the degree of control on managers’ self-dealing activities (Djankov et al. 2008), the extent to which lenders can collect
a commercial debt at ease, and the level of protection on private foreign investment (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), which
institutions believe to be the most important for firm access to external finance.
For our analysis, we use cyber-attack data collected from Hackmageddon (http://www.hackmageddon.com) which are
classified by target (Government, Industry, Financial and Crypto) and type (Cyber Crime, Cyber Espionage, Cyber Warfare
and Hacktivism). These are updated regularly through public sources such as blogs and news sites, and therefore the sample
collection cannot be complete, but it aims to provide a high level of overview of the cyber-attack threat landscape across the
globe (Passeri, 2020). Specifically, our sample includes 4693 daily cyber-attacks observations between 12 August 2015 and
15 January 2020 including daily overlaps. We use the daily number of cyber-attacks as an indicator of potential threats to the
digital economy. The data are also classified as attacks targeting either the US or non-US countries.
Following Uma and Padmavathi (2013), Cyber Crime is defined as a criminal offence which involves a computer either as
an object or a tool to commit a material component of the offence; Cyber Espionage is the cracking technique and malicious
software (e.g., Trojan horses and spy ware) used to obtain information without the permission of the holder from individuals,
groups and governments for gaining benefits through illegal abuse methods; Cyber Warfare is the use of computer technol-6
Fig. 3. Cyber-Attacks by Type.
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ing access to (and control over) third-party computer systems” (Bodford and Kwan, 2018).
Figs. 2 and 3 show, respectively, the cyber-attack targets and types used for the analysis. It is apparent from Fig. 1 that the
Industry sector is the most frequent target of cyber-attacks, which suggests that it is more vulnerable, compared to other
sectors (e.g., Government, Financial and Crypto) that have stronger cyber security protections. In particular, the Crypto cur-
rency exchanges appear to be the least targeted, presumably because their blockchain technology works effectively against
cyber-attacks and this being a new sector hackers need time to learn how to attack it successfully.
Fig. 3 shows that Cyber Crime is the most frequent type of cyber-attack, and Cyber Warfare the least frequent; this is not
surprising, since the latter is an attack on a nation’s computer network and thus on a larger scale relative to other types of
cyber-attacks. Within our sample, on any given day cyber-attacks can target one or more of the 122 countries considered
(including ‘unknown’ countries). The US, Canada, the UK and India are the most frequently targeted across the globe (Appen-
dix A and B).6 There are 1173 occurrences of cyber-attacks targeting more than one country, which is the second most frequent
case according to Appendix A – a plausible finding given the fact that by nature cyber-attacks are world-wide events without
geographical restrictions.6 Appendix II visualises the number of cyber-attacks per day by country; a darker shade indicates more frequent attacks. The ‘More than one country’ and





Government Cyber-attacks targeting the government sector. It shows 1 if it is a cyber-attack target and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple
times per day. We use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.
Industry Cyber-attacks targeting the industry sector. It shows 1 if it is a cyber-attack target and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple
times per day. We use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.
Financial Cyber-attacks targeting the financial sector. It shows 1 if it is a cyber-attack target and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple
times per day. We use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.
Crypto Cyber-attacks targeting the cryptocurrency exchange sector. It shows 1 if it is a cyber-attack target and 0 otherwise, which may
happen multiple times per day. We use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.
TARGET The aggregate number of daily attacks targeting Government, Industry and Finance sectors, which may happen multiple times per
day. To avoid the dummy variable trap, all other sectors are not included in the count.
Cyber Crime Cyber-attack type of cyber crime. It shows 1 if the attack type is cyber crime and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per
day. We use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.
Cyber
Espionage
Cyber-attack type of cyber espionage. It shows 1 if the attack type is cyber espionage and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple
times per day. We use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.
Cyber
Warfare
Cyber-attack type of cyber warfare. It shows 1 if the attack type is cyber warfare and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times
per day. We use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.
Hacktivism Cyber-attack type of hacktivism. It shows 1 if the attack type is hacktivism and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per
day. We use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.
TYPE The aggregate number of daily Cyber Crime, Cyber Espionage and Cyber Warfare attacks, which may happen multiple times per day.
To avoid the dummy variable trap, Hacktivism is not included in the count.
USA Cyber-attack targeting the USA. It shows 1 if the cyber-attack targets US and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day.
We use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.
Bitcoin Bitcoin log returns
Ethereum Ethereum log returns
Litecoin Litecoin log returns
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index
Notes: Data covers the period from 12 August 2015 to 15 January 2020.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics.
Variables Mean Median S.D. Min Max Obs. No. of attacks (% Attacks)
Crypto Currencies and VIX
Bitcoin 0.002 0.002 0.039 0.190 0.240 1316
Ethereum 0.003 0.001 0.068 0.285 0.381 1316
Litecoin 0.002 0.001 0.059 0.315 0.595 1316
VIX 15.02 13.65 4.482 9.140 37.32 1316
Cyber-attacks to Cryptocurrencies
Crypto 0.077 0 0.277 0 2 1316 97 (7.4%)
Cyber-attacks by Type
Cyber Crime 2.808 2 2.011 0 12 1316
Cyber Espionage 0.411 0 0.681 0 5 1316
Cyber Warfare 0.116 0 0.370 0 4 1316
Hacktivism 0.233 0 0.515 0 3 1316
Type 3.334 3 2.246 0 13 1316 1276 (97.0%)
Cyber-attacks by Target
Government 0.486 0 0.699 0 5 1316
Industry 0.888 1 1.020 0 6 1316
Financial 0.202 0 0.471 0 3 1316
Target 1.575 1 1.332 0 7 1316 1036 (78.8%)
Cyber-attacks to US
US 1.350 1 1.259 0 9 1316 952 (72.4%)
Notes: S.D. refers to sample standard deviation. No. of attacks (% Attacks) is the number of days (percentage of days) where at least one attack occurred. The
total number of attacks occurred over the sample period and % of days where at least one cyber-attack was registered are also reported. The cyber-attack
indicator Target is the cumulative index of cyber-attacks targeting Government, Industry and Financial sector, whereas the cyber-attack indicator Type is
the cumulative index of cyber-crime, cyber-espionage and cyber-warfare. Cyber-attacks to USA register attacks to companies who are fiscally registered in
the USA.
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Turbulent periods are identified as those corresponding to cyber-attacks. We construct the following four indicators of
cyber-attacks: i) by target (given by the aggregate number of daily attacks targeting Government, Industry and Finance),
named Target; ii) by type (given by the aggregate number of daily Cyber Crime, Cyber Espionage and Cyber Warfare attacks),
named Type; (iii) one given by the sum of daily attacks targeting crypto currencies only, named Crypto; finally iv) one given8
Table 3
Multivariate GARCH(1,1) Parameters Estimates – Crypto Currencies Cyber-Attacks.
No cyber-attacks Number of cyber-attacks per day






b12 0.012 (0.443) b12* 0.034 (0.533) 0.011 (0.973) 0.058 (0.133)
b13 0.014 (0.571) b13* 0.041 (0.515) 0.068 (0.992) 0.052 (0.345)
b22 0.023 (0.651)
b21 0.114 (0.162) b21* 0.145*** (0.009) 0.099 (0.995) 0.166*** (0.022)
b23 0.021 (0.675) b23* 0.031 (0.356) 0.113 (0.987) 0.018 (0.558)
b33 0.036 (0.465)
b31 0.037 (0.753) b31* 0.117** (0.023) 0.081 (0.634) 0.118** (0.057)
b32 0.022 (0.689) b32* 0.021 (0.551) 0.034 (0.971) 0.063* (0.063)
VIX => Bitcoin 0.043* (0.072)
VIX => Etherum 0.061* (0.083)
VIX => Litcoin 0.065* (0.077)
Conditional Variance Equation
a11 0.263*** (0.000)
a12 0.001 (0.896) a12* 0.043 (0.285) 0.131 (0.669) 0.061 (0.225)
a13 0.026 (0.332) a13* 0.039 (0.414) 0.168 (0.561) 0.041 (0.506)
a22 0.327*** (0.000)
a21 0.195** (0.055) a21* 0.162*** (0.043) 0.256 (0.872) 0.357*** (0.050)
a23 0.061 (0.342) a23* 0.177** (0.027) 0.144 (0.748) 0.368*** (0.001)
a33 0.345*** (0.001)
a31 0.401** (0.021) a31* 0.333*** (0.001) 0.065 (0.989) 0.598*** (0.009)
a32 0.145*** (0.000) a32* 0.404*** (0.000) 0.447 (0.889) 0.479*** (0.000)
g11 0.957*** (0.000)
g12 0.001 (0.852) g12* 0.011 (0.715) 0.058 (0.299) 0.018 (0.649)
g13 0.003 (0.749) g13* 0.063 (0.131) 0.203 (0.573) 0.091 (0.008)
g22 0.952*** (0.000)
g21 0.072** (0.025) g21* 0.052 (0.411) 0.151 (0.953) 0.109 (0.317)
g23 0.034* (0.079) g23* 0.071** (0.039) 0.449 (0.888) 0.249*** (0.007)
g33 0.907*** (0.000)
g31 0.144*** (0.002) g31* 0.212*** (0.000) 0.096 (0.763) 0.361** (0.085)
g32 0.036*** (0.006) g32* 0.138*** (0.000) 0.002 (0.901) 0.244*** (0.000)
Log-Lik 7248.12 7328.73 7262.31 7311.54
LB10 (Bit) 4.565 4.221 4.324 4.443
LB210 (Bit) 4.108 4.311 4.287 4.178
LB10 (Eth) 3.443 3.801 3.901 3.908
LB210 (Eth) 3.761 3.773 3.744 3.774
LB10 (Lit) 3.852 3.991 3.664 3.793
LB210 (Lit) 3.778 4.113 4.101 4.111
Notes: P-values are calculated using the quasi-maximum likelihood method of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992), which is robust to the distribution of the
underlying residuals. ***, **, * denote rejection at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Point estimates reported in the second column, headed No attacks, refer to the
restricted model where attacks were not taken into account and therefore shift dummies are not included. In the other columns only cross currencies shift
parameters, with dummies associated to the number of attacks according to the Crypto indicator, are reported. LB10(.) and LB210(.) are the Ljung and
Box (1978) of significance of no autocorrelations of 10 lags in the standardized and standardized squared residuals, respectively. The parameter b21
measures the causality effect of Bitcoin returns on Ethereum returns, whereas a21 measures the causality-in-variance effect of Bitcoin returns volatility on
Ethereum returns volatility. The effect of cyber-attacks on Ethereum returns is measured by (b21 + b21*) whereas (a21 + a21*) captures the effects on
conditional volatility. The covariance stationarity condition is satisfied by all the estimated models, all the eigenvalues of A11  A11 + G11  G11 being less
than one in modulus. Note that in the conditional variance equation the sign of the parameters cannot be determined.
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Woo-Young Kang, F. Spagnolo et al. J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money xxx (xxxx) xxxby the sum of daily attacks targeting the US, named US. We do not include all other sectors in Target and Hacktivism in Type
in order to avoid the dummy variable trap. The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index (VIX) is also included
in the model as a control variable.
For each of the four indicators discussed above, dummy variables are created which aim to capture the impact of the
number of daily attacks on the mean and volatility spillovers among cryptocurrencies. More specifically, a dummy is con-
structed for days where 1–2 cyber-attacks were registered, another one for days where 3–4 occurred and finally one for days
when more than 5 took place. These are included in the estimated model in turn. The aim is to establish whether there exists
a threshold in terms of the number of attacks required for the parameter shifts to occur and be statistically significant. Using
this model selection criterion we choose specifications including two dummies in the case of the Crypto indicator and three
in all other cases. It should be noted that there is an inverse relationship between the number of attacks per day and the
frequency of such an occurrence, namely days with a high number of attacks are less frequent. For example, our sample
includes 93 days with a single attack but only 4 with 2 attacks. Further, the number of days with 1–2 attacks represents9
Table 4
Multivariate GARCH(1,1) Parameters Estimates – Cyber-Attacks by Type.
No cyber-attacks Number of cyber-attacks per day






b12 0.012 (0.443) b12* 0.037 (0.239) 0.064 (0.332) 0.052 (0.604)
b13 0.014 (0.571) b13* 0.116 (0.546) 0.098 (0.645) 0.043 (0.444)
b22 0.023 (0.651)
b21 0.114 (0.162) b21* 0.122** (0.017) 0.031** (0.021) 0.053 (0.863)
b23 0.021 (0.675) b23* 0.217 (0.783) 0.061 (0.426) 0.251 (0.334)
b33 0.036 (0.465)
b31 0.037 (0.753) b31* 0.291*** (0.004) 0.174** (0.062) 0.054 (0.747)
b32 0.022 (0.689) b32* 0.115 (0.140) 0.051 (0.319) 0.071 (0.701)
VIX => Bitcoin 0.043* (0.072)
VIX => Etherum 0.061* (0.083)
VIX => Litecoin 0.065* (0.077)
Conditional Variance Equation
a11 0.263*** (0.000)
a12 0.001 (0.896) a12* 0.011 (0.560) 0.008 (0.775) 0.003 (0.924)
a13 0.026 (0.332) a13* 0.012 (0.591) 0.061 (0.173) 0.089 (0.363)
a22 0.327*** (0.000)
a21 0.195** (0.055) a21* 0.184** (0.017) 0.151** (0.032) 0.143* (0.092)
a23 0.061 (0.342) a23* 0.014 (0.827) 0.003 (0.917) 0.062 (0.814)
a33 0.345*** (0.001)
a31 0.401** (0.021) a31* 0.231** (0.048) 0.304*** (0.005) 0.358** (0.069)
a32 0.145*** (0.000) a32* 0.192* (0.083) 0.245* (0.098) 0.094 (0.091)
g11 0.957*** (0.000)
g12 0.001 (0.852) g12* 0.002 (0.815) 0.021 (0.302) 0.002 (0.991)
g13 0.003 (0.749) g13* 0.007 (0.898) 0.029 (0.291) 0.028 (0.519)
g22 0.952*** (0.000)
g21 0.072** (0.025) g21* 0.058** (0.050) 0.229** (0.048) 0.085 (0.913)
g23 0.034* (0.079) g23* 0.066 (0.244) 0.227** (0.038) 0.209 (0.667)
g33 0.907*** (0.000)
g31 0.144*** (0.002) g31* 0.098* (0.013) 0.231*** (0.004) 0.180** (0.050)
g32 0.036*** (0.006) g32* 0.007** (0.043) 0.183** (0.041) 0.114 (0.673)
Log-Lik 7248.12 7306.30 7285.98 7288.72
LB10 (Bit) 4.565 4.001 4.377 4.443
LB210 (Bit) 4.108 4.231 4.341 4.178
LB10 (Eth) 3.443 3.888 4.108 3.908
LB210 (Eth) 3.761 3.652 3.994 3.774
LB10 (Lit) 3.852 3.898 3.776 3.793
LB210 (Lit) 3.778 4.231 4.007 4.111
Notes: see notes Table 3.
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Woo-Young Kang, F. Spagnolo et al. J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money xxx (xxxx) xxx40% of the total in the case of the Type indicator and around 50% in the case of the Target or US ones. The corresponding
percentages for days with 3–4 attacks are less than half.
Table 1 provides a description of the crypto-attack indicators, whilst Table 2 reports some summary statistics. Most of the
series follow a right-skewed distribution, the Industry cyber-attacks target variable being the only exception. In other words,
cyber-attacks targeting Government, Financial and Crypto currency sectors are not very frequent, in contrast to the Industry
sector. Most types of cyber-attacks have a low frequency per day while Cyber Crime is highly volatile, with a maximum of 12




We test for volatility spillovers and contagion by placing restrictions on the relevant parameters and computing the fol-
lowing Wald test:W ¼ R bh0 RVar bh R0h i1 Rbhh i ð7Þ
10
Table 5
Multivariate GARCH(1,1) Parameters Estimates – Cyber-Attacks by Target.
No cyber-attacks Number of cyber-attacks per day






b12 0.012 (0.443) b12* 0.002 (0.884) 0.049 (0.310) 0.063 (0.669)
b13 0.014 (0.571) b13* 0.033 (0.347) 0.007 (0.829) 0.054 (0.687)
b22 0.023 (0.651)
b21 0.114 (0.162) b21* 0.234*** (0.001) 0.315** (0.026) 0.516** (0.044)
b23 0.021 (0.675) b23* 0.102** (0.065) 0.172** (0.080) 0.432** (0.033)
b33 0.036 (0.465)
b31 0.037 (0.753) b31* 0.236*** (0.001) 0.416** (0.041) 0.251** (0.064)
b32 0.022 (0.689) b32* 0.052 (0.214) 0.155*** (0.001) 0.266 (0.157)
VIX => Bitcoin 0.043* (0.072)
VIX => Etherum 0.061* (0.083)
VIX => Litecoin 0.065* (0.077)
Conditional Variance Equation
a11 0.263*** (0.000)
a12 0.001 (0.896) a12* 0.046 (0.291) 0.016 (0.382) 0.097 (0.361)
a13 0.026 (0.332) a13* 0.031 (0.518) 0.368 (0.583) 0.302 (0.126)
a22 0.327*** (0.000)
a21 0.195** (0.055) a21* 0.112 (0.485) 0.256** (0.034) 0.205** (0.047)
a23 0.061 (0.342) a23* 0.148*** (0.023) 0.002 (0.956) 0.101 (0.412)
a33 0.345*** (0.001)
a31 0.401** (0.021) a31* 0.190** (0.071) 0.174** (0.019) 0.488** (0.030)
a32 0.145*** (0.000) a32* 0.050 (0.398) 0.095** (0.013) 0.427** (0.014)
g11 0.957*** (0.000)
g12 0.001 (0.852) g12* 0.012 (0.541) 0.066 (0.665) 0.098 (0.395)
g13 0.003 (0.749) g13* 0.044 (0.539) 0.057 (0.502) 0.139 (0.270)
g22 0.952*** (0.000)
g21 0.072** (0.025) g21* 0.021*** (0.002) 0.299*** (0.008) 0.187 (0.428)
g23 0.034* (0.079) g23* 0.085** (0.036) 0.056** (0.097) 0.173 (0.268)
g33 0.907*** (0.000)
g31 0.144*** (0.002) g31* 0.121** (0.053) 0.129*** (0.001) 0.442 (0.004)
g32 0.036*** (0.006) g32* 0.049 (0.159) 0.242*** (0.001) 0.324** (0.014)
Log-Lik 7248.12 7310.72 7193.24 7254.10
LB10 (Bit) 4.565 4.221 4.285 4.006
LB210 (Bit) 4.108 4.311 4.009 4.207
LB10 (Eth) 3.443 3.801 3.666 4.111
LB210 (Eth) 3.761 3.773 4.234 3.978
LB10 (Lit) 3.852 3.991 4.007 3.709
LB210 (Lit) 3.778 4.113 4.301 4.229
Notes: see notes Table 3.
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h is a k  1 vector of the estimated parameters, and Var bh  is the heteroscedasticity - robust consistent estimator for the
covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. The tests involve joint hypotheses at two and four degrees of freedom (k).
Overall we test nine sets of null hypotheses, three for each cryptocurrency. Below we report three sets of null hypotheses
where spillover or contagion originates from Bitcoin.
Tests of no volatility spillovers and/or contagion.
H01: No volatility spillovers and no contagion from Bitcoin to Litecoin: a31 = a31* = g31 = g31* = 0. The null hypothesis
assumes that volatility in Litecoin is never influenced by volatility in Bitcoin, neither over the full sample period nor
specifically during episodes of turbulence associated to cyber-attacks.
H02: No contagion, that is, no shift in the transmission of volatility from Bitcoin to Litecoin during episodes of turbulence,
in the former: a31* = g31* = 0.
H03: No volatility spillovers from Bitcoin to Litecoin over the full sample period: a31 = g31 = 0. This hypothesis comple-
ments H02. If we reject H03 and do not reject H02, there is no volatility contagion, only spillovers; if we do not reject
H03 and reject H02, volatility is transmitted from Bitcoin to Litecoin only during days when attacks occurred, which
implies ‘‘shift contagion.”11
Table 6
Multivariate GARCH(1,1) Parameters Estimates – Cyber-Attacks to the United States.
No cyber-attacks Number of cyber-attacks per day






b12 0.012 (0.443) b12* 0.002 (0.895) 0.022 (0.613) 0.036 (0.718)
b13 0.014 (0.571) b13* 0.041 (0.101) 0.044 (0.339) 0.115 (0.271)
b22 0.023 (0.651)
b21 0.114 (0.162) b21* 0.191** (0.047) 0.014** (0.083) 0.120** (0.011)
b23 0.021 (0.675) b23* 0.170 (0.126) 0.071 (0.757) 0.013 (0.922)
b33 0.036 (0.465)
b31 0.037 (0.753) b31* 0.122** (0.092) 0.107** (0.029) 0.104** (0.034)
b32 0.022 (0.689) b32* 0.021 (0.592) 0.073 (0.265) 0.133 (0.338)
VIX => Bitcoin 0.043* (0.072)
VIX => Etherum 0.061* (0.083)
VIX => Litecoin 0.065* (0.077)
Conditional Variance Equation
a11 0.263*** (0.000)
a12 0.001 (0.896) a12* 0.031 (0.542) 0.022 (0.496) 0.121 (0.105)
a13 0.026 (0.332) a13* 0.017 (0.651) 0.012 (0.709) 0.316 (0.186)
a22 0.327*** (0.000)
a21 0.195** (0.055) a21* 0.085** (0.049) 0.059** (0.047) 0.077** (0.054)
a23 0.061 (0.342) a23* 0.138** (0.021) 0.106** (0.045) 0.165 (0.564)
a33 0.345*** (0.001)
a31 0.401** (0.021) a31* 0.037** (0.088) 0.039** (0.050) 0.031** (0.018)
a32 0.145*** (0.000) a32* 0.218*** (0.001) 0.126* (0.095) 0.070* (0.083)
g11 0.957*** (0.000)
g12 0.001 (0.852) g12* 0.013 (0.444) 0.015 (0.433) 0.052 (0.541)
g13 0.003 (0.749) g13* 0.023 (0.488) 0.011 (0.608) 0.066 (0.266)
g22 0.952*** (0.000)
g21 0.072** (0.025) g21* 0.031* (0.067) 0.094* (0.097) 0.004** (0.062)
g23 0.034* (0.079) g23* 0.001 (0.980) 0.023** (0.015) 0.039 (0.811)
g33 0.907*** (0.000)
g31 0.144*** (0.002) g31* 0.053** (0.031) 0.124** (0.014) 0.352** (0.059)
g32 0.036*** (0.006) g32* 0.122*** (0.001) 0.074* (0.071) 0.274*** (0.015)
Log-Lik 7248.12 7299.66 7259.67 7253.74
LB10 (Bit) 4.565 4.156 4.004 4.612
LB210 (Bit) 4.108 4.443 4.307 4.220
LB10 (Eth) 3.443 3.976 4.132 3.879
LB210 (Eth) 3.761 3.697 3.807 3.664
LB10 (Lit) 3.852 3.878 3.776 3.991
LB210 (Lit) 3.778 4.009 4.224 3.978
Notes: see notes Table 3.
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Woo-Young Kang, F. Spagnolo et al. J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money xxx (xxxx) xxxWe test the same hypotheses for Litecoin as a conduit for volatility transmission to Bitcoin and Ethereum first and then
Ethereum to Bitcoin and Litecoin.



















, respectively, and test for
increases during days attacks were registered compared to days when attacks did not occur. The test results are reported
in Table 7.4.2. Discussion of the results
In order to test the adequacy of the models, Ljung–Box portmanteau tests were performed on the standardized and stan-
dardized squared residuals. Overall, the results indicate that the selected VAR-GARCH(1,1) specification captures satisfacto-
rily the persistence in the volatility of cryptocurrencies in all estimated models. There is evidence of causality effects in the
conditional mean and variance, where the latter are more marked. Note that the sign of the coefficients on cross-market
volatilities cannot be determined. Point estimates of the VAR-GARCH(1,1) model parameters, as well as the associated robust
p-values and likelihood function values, are presented in Tables 3–6. We select the optimal lag length of the mean equation
using the Schwarz information criterion. Mean and volatility spillovers are tested by means of Wald test by placing restric-
tions on the relevant parameters as discussed in Section 4.1.12
Table 7
Tests of Changes in Conditional Correlations.
Number of cyber-
attacks per day
Total Number of cyber-
attacks (% over the total)
Correlations
Bitcoin - Litcoin Bitcoin - Ethereum Ethereum - Litcoin
Mean Variance Reject
H0
Mean Variance RejectH0 Mean Variance RejectH0
No Attacks
None N/A 0.665 0.225 0.473 0.358 0.489 0.376
Cyber-Attacks to Crypto Currencies























































































































Cyber-Attacks to the US






































Notes: Averages and standard deviations of pairwise conditional correlations (q12,t, q13,t, and q23,t) for sub-samples including days where cyber-attacks
occurred are reported whereas averages and standard deviations of pairwise conditional correlations for sub-samples including days where cyber-attacks
were not registered are reported in round brackets. The null hypothesis of equal correlation means among the latter and the former are tested. ***, **, *
denote rejection of the null hypothesis of an equal conditional correlation (H0: Corr. without Cyber-attacks = Corr. with Cyber-attacks) against the
alternative (H1: Corr. without Cyber-attacks – Corr. with Cyber-attacks) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Woo-Young Kang, F. Spagnolo et al. J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money xxx (xxxx) xxxThe following points are noteworthy. When cyber-attacks are not taken into account there is little evidence of causality-
in-mean at the standard 5% significance level, whereas causality-in-variance is detected, with volatility spillovers running
from Bitcoin to Litecoin (a31 =0.401) and Ethereum (a21 =0.195), and also from Ethereum to Litecoin (a32 = 0.145). Overall,
the estimated parameters indicate that volatility spillovers run from Bitcoin (but not from Litecoin) to the other two
cryptocurrencies.
Further, cyber-attacks are found to affect the dynamic linkages between cryptocurrencies, as indicated by the statistical
significance in various cases of the dummies discussed in Section 3.2. In particular, on days during which only one cyber-
attack targeting cryptocurrencies occurred (93 days over the whole sample), there is a downward shift (negative contagion)
in the parameter measuring mean spillovers running from Bitcoin to Litecoin (b31* = 0.145) and Ethereum (b21* = 0.117),
which suggests that cryptocurrency investors react to cyber-attacks by diversifying and therefore prefer to hold Bitcoin and
short the other two cryptocurrencies. On days when two attacks occurred no shift could be detected, presumably because
there are only four such days out of the 1316 included in our sample. When cyber-attacks are considered by Type lower
mean spillovers are found running from Bitcoin to Litecoin (b31* = 0.122) and Ethereum (b21* = 0.291) on days when
1–2 attacks were registered. The size of the shift is bigger, in absolute value, on days when 3–4 attacks occurred, and smaller
on days with five or more attacks. When cyber-attacks are classified instead by Target, again a shift is detected in the param-
eter measuring the mean spillovers from Bitcoin to the other two cryptocurrencies, its magnitude increasing (in absolute
value) with the number of registered attacks per day. A similar pattern emerges when using the previously defined US indi-
cator, though the size of the shift is now inversely related to the number of attacks per day. Finally, the estimated coefficients
on the exogenous variable (VIX) are negative and significant, which suggests that a higher level of uncertainty in conven-
tional stock markets has an impact on cryptocurrency returns.13
Fig. 4. Conditional Correlations.
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Woo-Young Kang, F. Spagnolo et al. J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money xxx (xxxx) xxxTo sum up, our results indicate that there are no significant causality-in-mean effects at the standard 5% significance level.
In the case of Bitcoin mean spillovers emerge when cyber-attacks are taken into account, although the size of the shift varies
depending on the cyber-attack indicator which is used. As for linkages between the second moments, there are significant
volatility spillovers from Bitcoin to Litecoin and Ethereum, whose size is again magnified by the inclusion of cyber-attack
indicators. The largest parameter shifts are detected when the Crypto indicator is included in the model, followed by Target
and Type. Specifically, shifts are estimated in the parameters measuring volatility spillovers between Ethereum
(a23*=0.177) and Litecoin (a32*=0.404); again, the largest shifts in the conditional variance–covariance matrix off-
diagonal parameters are found when using the Crypto indicator. The implication of these findings is that cyber-attacks play14
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Woo-Young Kang, F. Spagnolo et al. J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money xxx (xxxx) xxxan important role in shaping the dynamic linkages between cryptocurrencies, especially between their volatilities. Bitcoin
clearly stands out as the dominant cryptocurrency.
Finally, there is also evidence of co-movement between cryptocurrencies, as shown by the conditional correlations
obtained from the VAR-GARCH(1,1) model (Fig. 4). In particular, when attacks are not taken into account, the conditional
correlations between the three cryptocurrencies are generally positive. On average their mean value is around 0.47, except
in the case of Bitcoin-Litecoin, when it is substantially higher (0.66). It is also noteworthy that there has been an upward shift
in pairwise correlations since 2018, the year when the cryptocurrency crash occurred (see Fry, 2018). Summary (mean and
standard deviations) statistics for the conditional correlations, with and without cyber-attacks, along with equal mean tests
are reported in Table 7. Subsample conditional correlations including only days when attacks occurred have generally higher
mean values compared to those without attacks. The largest shifts occur in the case of cyber-attacks targeting cryptocurren-
cies, though all categories of attacks have an impact on the dynamic correlations.
5. Conclusions
The objective of this study is to shed new light on the dynamic linkages (interdependence) between cryptocurrencies, and
on whether shifts in their spillover parameters (contagion) are associated with the occurrence of cyber-attacks (contagion),
the latter topic not having been previously investigated in the rapidly growing literature on cryptocurrencies. Specifically,
trivariate VAR-GARCH (1, 1) models for Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin returns and their volatilities are estimated, and tests
are carried out for the presence of spillovers (interdependence), as well as for possible shifts in the spillover parameters dur-
ing days when cyber-attacks occurred; in the latter case, the statistical significance of appropriately defined dummies taking
into account their type and target (for which four indicators are constructed) as well as their number per day is tested. Con-
ditional correlations are also calculated for the series of interest.
Our results provide a number of interesting insights. In particular, they suggest that cyber-attacks influence the dynamics
of conditional returns and variances, with the spillover parameters shifting during days when cyber-attacks take place. Var-
ious previous studies had already highlighted changes over time in the linkages between cryptocurrencies (see Boako et al.,
2019, Ji et al., 2019, Yi et al., 2018, Katsiampa, 2019, Antonakakis et al., 2019 etc.), but the present one is the first to provide
evidence that they are related to the occurrence of cyber-attacks. Despite some differences associated with the number of
attacks per day, their type and target, in general cyber-attacks appear to strengthen cross-market linkages, thereby reducing
portfolio diversification opportunities for cryptocurrency investors. Further, Bitcoin seems to play a dominant role (consis-
tently with the evidence reported by Koutmos, 2018, Ji et al., 2019 and others). The conditional correlation analysis confirms
these findings.
Future research will aim to establish whether cyber-attacks also affect the linkages between cryptocurrency markets and
other asset markets, which has important implications for the suitability of cryptocurrencies for diversification purposes
and/or as a safe haven or hedge.
Appendix A. Cyber-attack target country and countCyber-attack target country15Cyber-attack countUnited States of America 1775
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Syrian Arab Republic 5
Afghanistan 4
Cyprus 4
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